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Blackledge (state warden) v. Perry

pea issue.

Cert to CA 4
NO RESPONSE
Does
.____ a guilty plea waive a double jeopardy claim? The .USDC sitting in
HC in this case held that it does not. CA 4 affirmed by order (Craven, Butzner,
Russell). A number of other CAs have held that a guilty plea

~

waive a

double jeopardy claim.
Petitioner received a 6 months sentence in a North Carolina trial court for
the misdemeanor of assault with a deadly weapon. North Carolina has a two-tier
system for adjudicating certain criminal cases, under which a person charged

2.

with a misdemeanor may be tried first in an inferior court and, if dissatisfied
with the result, may have a trial de novo in a court of general criminal
jurisdiction but must risk a greater punishment if convicted. Such a system
is permissible under the due process . and double jeopardy clauses. Colten v.
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972) (Powell, J . in .majority). Petitioner moved
for a trial de n?vo. Up to

tha~

point, no constitutional problems appeared.

Double Jeopardy Issues
However, prior to trial de novo petitioner was indicted anew for the same
offense, this time for the felony of assault with a deadly weapon with intent

-----

to kill. Thus, when Petitioner carne to his trial de novo, he faced a much more
serious offense. The US DC held this to be a violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. It read Colten, supra, to mean that the state could allow trial de novo
(with the risk of greater punishment) only where the charge at the new trial was
identical to the charge at the original trial. This holding is, I believe, correct.
Guilty Plea Issues
The case is made
trial

~ ~.

c~plex,

however because Petitioner pleaded guilty at the

The state argues in its petition that the guilty plea waived any

double jeopardy problems. There is CA authority for this position. The USDC,
affirmed by CA 4, held to the contrary, on the theory that double jeopardy

.

went to the jurisdiction of the de novo trial court, was a fundamental right, and
was not waivable .
Cases from this Court aren't helpful. A split in the CAs does appear,
although all CAs may not have faced the issue. The question might be certworthy.
Call for a response.
Owens

September 16, 1973
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RESPONSE RECEIVED

JJ. Brennan, White and Rehnquist joined you in seeking a
response in this case.

The issue presented is whether a guilty

plea waives a double jeopardy claim.
Respondent appears via appointed counsel,

Counsel notes

wryly that respondent was released from the custody of state
. . authorities pursuant to the order of USDC J, Larkins (E.D,
No, Car,) "and his present whereabouts to counsel are unknown,"
,~------------------------------------

Accordingly, with no knowledge of respondent's fi~ncial status,
counsel moves the Court to dispense with printing requirements,
On the merits, respondent "concedes that certain language
in the recent case of Tollett v, Henderson {this Court, OT 1972)
• • • • would support a contention that the plea of guilty does

-2-

foreclose the raising of a constitutional claim, and
limits an attack to the question of whether the voluntary and
intelligent character of the guilty plea has been prejudicial
(sic) by advice of counsel not
. demanded of attorneys in •

0

withinl the range of competence

criminal cases.

1

However, resp

"

urges the court to heed the admonition of the dissent in Tollett

J that

wa iver should be 1111 decided on a case by case basis.
Resp

e

also argues that his double jeopardy claim is

controlled by a USSC case decided subsequent to his trial yet
fully retroactive.
v. Georgia, 398

u.s.

(The case that allegedly controls is Price
323).

Thus, Resp argues that it would be

fundamentally unfair to argue that he waived a right that he
did not

----------------------------------------------Ill know existed.

The latter argument is mildly ingenious, but I don't think
it will wash.

·17~

\} .qJ;-

Price v. Ga. establishes that if you are charged

w;:;;-:urde: 1 but convicted of murder 2, you have in essence

, ; / been found not guilty of murder 1,

~~

Therefore, if your conviction

for murder 2 is ultimately overturned, you cannot be retried for
murder 1 but only for murder 2.

As you will see b, glancing at

the facts set out in the original memo in this case, 1111 resp
does not have such a case.

_____________

, has the traditional double
He
jeopardy

case of being tried and convicted of Ia murder 2 and then reindicted

a~:~~~e1 ·

Resp has no argument that any jury
..__

has implicitly found him not guilty of a higher offens e in the

~

--

=:::::

::::::::

===--

==

process of conviction for a lesser offense.

All of- this means

that Petr's case was controlled by longstanding double jeopardy
principles (rather than by Price) and thus it cannot be said
I

"-!

-3•

that holding resp to the full meaning of his guilty plea
would amount to forcing him to waive a right he could not
have known existed.
Resp also throws . . in some speculation that his
guilty plea might have been induced by a Santobello violation
(i.e., by a failure on the part of the state II to come through
on its side of a plea bargain).

This looks to be made up; at

least it can't be addressed on the
case.
The case looks like a grant.

111111

present record of this

, September 25, 1973

~~

JBO

J ~ o~~~~
~~V~~

Discuss

(_c:;...,-2-..ctz..l"-o~

~ ~- ~ 'P--e.J..e~. T__~ ,f:-1! L(.S. ,Sf;'-lo7
Tw--o~: '-:u~~~lo~

u...~- -1-o"f~~ ~
( ~~-y c:...-1 ..... 4!::!!:- ~ ~
AA ~)
• -..c- ..:..,.,., /4 ( c.,.-l../a,..-.) ~
.....-I
$
''
,,
,J

I.
~

Va.-.

~"7 <::~ -~

.lA_ •

,~ t::....~..l'~ -,.

.A~F~~~~·

~~~ ... A ~~rv~ ~
Y- VJ4...~ S'~ ~ t:J4••._c4A

.~
7\

tA-/.c-....::t- .to ~).

I

I~

(~

\

............ .t:....

.L'J

..:RV.J , _~ 1-11>.,."""""

A

~.......~ ·'~··l""'

~~J.~)
2.

a...

~ ~~l.t· ~~~·~

~~ cRA:.,J~ etf lr/~ ~

~ ij~ ~ ~::

C.. ,4 ~

4 ..

;..JL

>

2

slt#o \'-

No. 72·1660 ~ J)-j<}, tA..- ~ ~ENT~ )4EMO
Blackledge (state ward 6.rtf v. PrJry ~~-A; ~ ~ ~.

0

As the attached memos indicate, the primary issur. in
this case is whether a guilty plea waives a double jeopardy
claim.

--

CA4 held that it did not,

for summary reversal.

w~ich

may be error calling

One of the clerks in J. White's chambersp Hal Scott, also
thinks the case raises a potentially certworthy ''double jeopardyI!
issue.

As I expect J. White to add this case to the discuss

list~ I

think we can rely on him to carry the ball on a.this

one, particularly since he authored the most relevant recent
. . 5 precedent, Colten v. Kentucky, 407

u.s.

memo will therefore simply set out some

skele~al background to

104 (1972).

This

assist you in evaluating J. White's presentation of the case
/

at Conference.

* ~~~ J,{JJ t1~

:z

~~ ~ ~~·Cit.

-2As you will remember from glancing at the earlier memos,
the case involves the North Carolina two-tier criminal trial
system, very similar to the Kentucky system approved by the
court in the Colten case, supra.

At • the NC District Court

(the lower tier), .._ Respondent was found guilty of assault
with a deadly weapon.

He sought trial de novo ("appealed") in

the NC Superior Court (the upper tier).
jh;$ \~~adMJ
IAJA.C
~

JoA~pl -~
.$tliM~

\~t..,·J~- ttf.

However, in the

interim the state brought down a new indictiment charging him
. . . . . with the greater offense of assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill.
this point.

Respondent pleaded guilty at

Subsequently, he sought federal HC on due process

(deterrence of the right to "appeal," etc) and double
jeopardy grounds.

The USDC (J. Larkin) granted HC on the

ground that Resp 0 s double jeopardy rights had been violated.
CA4 (Braxton 0 Butzner, Russell) aff'd in a memo decision.
The USDC concluded that Resp had a valid double jeopardy
claim •

~b~ l\ow ~
fA.$Dl.. ~wi~
+o tJa.te pr«~
,,~~t.jt

p despite Col ten v. Kentucky.

In that court's words a

Although it is clear that Colton (sic) allows the
state to operate a two tier system of ctiminal justiceo with
trial de nove upon appeal from the lower Court, the Court
cannot say that a system is valid when the offense charged
is not the same in both Courts. To allow the situation which
has occurred in this- cas e to be a part of such a system would
be a gross miscarriage of justice. An absolute right of appeal
is but a hollow phrase if a trial de novo is not held on the
( same offense as it was held on in the lower Court.
If the State were allowed to try a defendant on a
misdemeanor in the lower Court, and then to try the same
defendant for a felony in the higher Court when the lower
Court convictioon is contested 9 the iesult in the lower Court
would be meaningless, and the District Court trial would be
little more than a "proving ground" for the State's case. If
a conviction can be secured on one of the essential elements
of a felony in the lower Court, it would appear all the more
simple to secure the felony conviction in the Superior Court.
The State has, in effect, a choice in these matters. It may
try the defendant for a misdemeanor in the District Cmurt 0 or
it may try a defendant for a felony in the Superior Court. But
it may not try a defendant for both offenses arising out of the
same incident, in two separate Courts. Once there has been an
election to try one offense as opposed to the
other 9 that
election is binding.

In other words, the USDC read Colten as setting the
outside limits on what the states. can do with two-tier
trial systems.

The offense charged must be the same at

both tiers, even though the punishment can • differ.

Note that

terms, its holding
was really based on the Due • Process
Colten is all about,

which is what

c 1a~se,

Colten really deals with the question

of whether trial de novo with the risk of enhanced punishment
.... impermissible deters the right to "appeal •• in a North
Carolina v. Pearce, due process senseo
Hal Scott contends, and I think that J, White agrees,
that what the state did in this case did

~

constitute

double jeopardy
. and was permissible as a matter of due
process

W'-

wit~the

limits of Colten, Thus, he

thi ~ that

the

state wins in this one on either of two grounds~~at there
was~

substantive constitutional violation to begin with,

and that if there was, it was waived by the guilty plea,
I agree with the latter point; I'm less certain of the first.
For some of the reasons listed by the USDC, I would want to
give very careful thought to whether, within the login of
Colten, the state could up the charge on the trial de novo.
~ Hal

says that once the defendant decides to have another

crack at it, the slate is wiped entirely clean with regard to
the first trial,

That would expand Colten, in my mind, and

I'm not sure that the expansion would be wise.

It might tend

to undermine what looks to be an efficacious system under
present law,

In any event, defer to what J. White has to say about
this case with regard to whether there is any substantive
constitutional violation at all.
A concluding notea
je~ardy

case,

wh~n

the USDC treated this as a double

in truth it may be a due process,

"---------------------------Thus, it

__,~
deterrence of the right to "appeal" CJlse.
-

- -

( As =t

technically inaccurate to

"'-;...,.

f'C ~ t...,')

say~that

may be

the primary issue is

whether a guilty plea waives a double jeopardy claim.

However,

that probably doesn't make much difference, as I take it that
a guilty plea would waive either a double jeopardy claim or
a due process, "chill of appeal rights" claim.
This case is undoubtedly tiiK going to have to be vacated
and remanded.

The task of the conference will be to decide

what instructions to give the lower courts on remand--simply
to clarify the impact of a guilty plea or to in addition speak
to what the USDC said about substantive constitutional issues.
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I "passed" at the Conference on Friday,
you hear from me further.
"'
.. ,. ;,};.i~)~~t'J:. :~·· '\:

-": 11.' t.?~···-.

-x·., • As I stated at the Conference, I had thought that this case was
controlled by Tollett. I do n<t consider the defense of double jeopardy,
even if it were-· applicable, to be jurisdictional. If, as I have thought,
an uncoerced guilty plea with advice of counsel waives constitutional
rights (~. _g. , jury trial) as well as procedural defects, I would have
thought that such a plea would waive such right a~ the defendant had
. not to be charged with a more serious offense. ~~ 1; """ ., • . ur. ,

·" WhHe. I still incline to this view, I will reconsider my position
in light of .mtalscussion at the Conference and particularly in view of
what may be written. But for the time being, I am inclined to adhere
to my initial view.

2nd DRAFT

To: The
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr .

Chief Tu~tice
I 1unlas
Jur,t, l.c' B· ,_,nnan
Just·c( \ .ti~o
Jur;;;Lc'} ~· S'1"1ll
Just c
.J w· ... ,..m
Justice OI.Ul . /
Justice R~hnruist
Ju~t~c~

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITEffSTA¥Es r~,R J: r.
Circu l ated:

No. 72-1660
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Stanley Blackledge, Warden, On Writ of Certiorari to
et al., Petitioners,
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the
Jimmy Seth Perry.
Fourth Circuit.
[Apnl
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MR. Jus•r1cE STEWAR"J' delivered th e opnuon of tht>
Court.
While servmg a term of impnsonment in a North
Carolina penitentiary, the respondent P erry became
involved in an altercation with another inmate. A
warrant issued. charging Perry with the misdemeanor
' of assault with a deadly weapon , N, C. Gen. S.tat.
~ 14-33 (b)(l) (1969 ed.) . Under North Carolin a law,
t he District Court Division of the General Court of
.Justice has exclusive jurisdiction for the trial of misdemeanors. N. C. Gen. Stat. ~ 7A- 272. Following a
trial without a jury in the District Court of Northampton County, Perry was convicted of this misdemeanor
and given a six-month sentence , to be served after completion of the prison term he was then serving.
Perry then filed a notice of appeal to the Northampton
County Superior Court. Under ~orth Carolina law, a
person convicted in the District Court has a right to a
trial de novo in the Superior Court. N. C. Gen . Stat.
~~ 7A-290, 15- 177.1.
The right to trial de novo is
absolute, there being no need for the appellant to allege
error in the original proceeding. When an appeal is taken ,
the statutory scheme provides that the slate is wiped clean ;

'

9~

~

h<,_J~

~~

~tJf

~~
~

/~ &ft ·

~~

~
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the prior conviction is annulled, and the prosecution and
the defense begin anew in the Superior Court. 1
After the filing of the notice of appeal, but prior to
the respondent's appearance for trial de novo in the
Superior Court, the prosecutor obtained an indictment
from a grand jury, charging Perry with the felony of
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflict~
ing serious bodily iujury, N. C. Gen. Stat. 14-32. The
indictment covered the same conduct for which Perry
had been tried and convicted in the District Court.
Perry entered a plea of guilty to the indictment in the
Superior Court, and was sentenced to a term of five to
seven years in the penitentiary, to be served concurrently
with the prison sentence he was then serving. 2
A number of months later, the respondent filed an
application for a writ of habeas corpus in the Pnited
States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina. He claimed that the indietment on the felony
charge in the Superior Court constituted double jeopardy
and also deprived him of due process of law. In an Ul1reported opinion, the District Court dismissed the petition

s

See genemlly State v Spencer, 276 N. C. 535, 173 S. E. 2cl 764;
State v. Spw·1·ow, 276 N . l'. 499, 17:3 S. E. 2d S97 .
1

2
The respondent '~ guilty plra wa ~ apparently prr mt;;ed on the
expectation that. an~· ~entpnce hP rrc(•ived in the ~up erior court
would be ~erved concurrently with the ~P ntence hr wa.s then ~rrving ,
as contra~ted wtth the con~t'c:utivr ~entell('<' impo~erl in the Di~trict
Court. That PXJlC'elation was fulfilled , but it turned out that the
guilty plPa re~ulted in mcrea ~ ing the re::;pondrnt 's potential t erm of
incarceration. Under applicable ::'\orth Carolina law, the five- to
~even-y ea r m;::;ault ::;rntenc r did not commrnc<' until the date of the
guilty plea, October 29, 19()9 . By that time, Perry had already
::;erved some 17 month~ of the sentence he wa::; serving at the time
of the alleged a::;~ault. Thu~, thr effect of the fivr- to seven-yrar
concurrent ~entrnce on tl1<' as.~ault charge was to mcrca;o;e hi::; potential period of confinement by t hr::;e 17 months, as opposrd to the
six-month i11erea:sr rnvi::;ag('d by the Di ~trict Court's con:;ecutive

~ontcnce .

72-i660-0PINION
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for failure to exhaust available state remedies. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed, holding that resort to the state courts would
be futile, because the Supreme Court of North Carolina
had consistently rejected the constitutional claims preJ
sented by Perry in his petition. 453 F. 2d 856.a The
case was remanded to the District Court for further
proceedings.
On remand, the District Court granted the writ. It
held that the bringing of the felony charge after the filing
of the appeal violated Perry's rights under the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784. The District Court
further held that the respondent had not, by his guilty
plea in the Superior Court, waived his right to raise his
constitutional claims in the federal habeas corpus proceeding. F. Supp. - . The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in a brief per curiam. opinion.
F. 2d --. We granted certiorari, 414 U. S. 980, to conw
sider the seemingly important issues presented by this
case.
The Court of AppPab further m~tructPd thP District Comt to
await the ruling of thi~ Comt in Rice Y. North Carolina, 434 F . 2d
297 (CA4), cPrt. grant<.>d , 401 U. S. 1008. Ru·e involved a challenge to the collstitutionalily of an enhauced penalty rec<.>ived after
a criminal defendant had ::;ought a trial de novo under North Carolina'::; two-tiered misdPmeanor adjudication system. This Court did
not reach the merit~ of this issue in Rice, instead vacating and
remanding to the Court of Appeals for consideration as to whcthPr
the case h11,d become moot 404 U. S. 244.
Subsequpntly, in Cotten v. Kentucky, 407 U . S. 104, we dealt with
the merits of this i::;::;ue, and h<.>ld that thr Imposition of an increased
::;entence on trial de 'IWVO did not violatr rither the Dur Process or
the Double .Teopardy Clause. Tlw District Court in the present,
ca~e had the benefit of the Cotten decision beforE> issuing its opinion
granting habea<~ corpus reliff.
3
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I
As in the District Court, Perry directs two independent constitutional attacks upon the conduct of the
State in hailing him into court on the felony charge after
he took an appeal from the misdemeanor conviction.
First, he conte11ds that the felony indictment in the
superior court placed him in double jeopardy, since he
had already been convicted on the lesser included misdemeanor charge in the District Court. Second, he urges
that the indictment on the felony charge constituted
a penalty for his exercising his statutory right to appeal ,
and thus contravened the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' We find it necessary to reach
only the latter claim .
Perry's due process arguments are derived substantially from A'orth Carolina \'. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 , and
its progeny. In Pearce, the Court considered the constitutional problems presented when, following a successful
appeal and reconviction, a criminal defendant was subjected to a greater punishment than that imposed at the
first trial. While we concluded that such a harsher sentence was uot absolutely precluded by either the Double
Jeopardy or Due Process Clause, we emphasized that
"imposition of a penalty upon the defendant for having
successfully pursued a statutory right of appeal or collateral remedy would be .. . a violation of due process
4
Thi::; Court ha::; nevrr lwld that the State:; are cou:;titutionnlly
required to e:;tabli~h avenue:,; of appellate revirw of criminal convtction:,;. Nonetheless, ''it i:,; now fundamrntal that , oncP Pstablishcd,
these avmuc:; mu:;t be kt•pt frN' of unrra:;onrd di::;t inction::; that
can only imprde opm and equal aece~:;:; to thP courts." Rinaldi v.
Yeager, 3H4 U. S. ;305, :no. See abo G1imn v. Illinois, :351 U. S.

12; Douglas v. ('alijornia. :372 U. S . ;~;35; Lane v. Brou•n , :372 U S.

477 ; Draper v. Washington , :372 U. S. 487 ; North ('aroliua v.
Pearce, :395 U S. 711 , 7:24-725 ; Chaffin v 8tyuchcombe, 412 U !3.
17, 24 11 11.

72-i660-0PINiON
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of law." !d., at 724. Because "vindictiveness against
a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives
after a new trial," id., at 725, we held that an increased
sentence could not be imposed upon retrial unless the
sentencing judge placed certain specified findings on the
record .
In Cotten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104, the Court was
called upon to decide the applicability of the Pearce
holding to Kentucky's two-tiered system of criminal
adjudication. Keutucky. like North Carolina, allows
a misdemeanor defendant convicted in an inferior trial
court to seek a retrial de novo in a court of general
jurisdiction.5 The appellant in Colten claimed that the
Constitution prevented the court of general jurisdiction
after trial de novo, from imposing a sentence in excess of
that imposed in the court of original trial. This Court
rejected the Pearte analogy . Emphasizing that Pearce
was directed at insuring the absence of "vindictiveness"
against a criminal defendant who attacked his initial
conviction on appeal. the Court found such dangers
greatly minimized on the facts presentcrt in Cotten. In
contrast to Pearce, the court that imposed the increased
sentence after retrial in Colten was not the one whose
original judgment had prompted an appellate reversal ;
thus, there was little possibility that an increasPd sentence on trial de novo could have been motivated by personal vindictiveness on the part of thE' sentencing judge.
Hence, the Court thought the prophylactic rule of
Pearce unnecessary in the de novo trial and sentencing
context of Colten
The Pearce decision was again interpreted by this
Court last Term in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U. fl . 17,
li For ft mor<• E-xhaustive list of StatE'::; employing ::;nmlur two-tlcred
procedures, SE'e ('olten , supra, a1 112 n 4.
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in the setting of Georgia's system under which sentencing
responsibility is entrusted to the jury. Upon retrial
following the reversal of his original conviction, the
defendant in Chaffin was reconvicted and sentenced to
a greater term than had been imposed by the initial
jury. Concentrating again on the issue of vindictiveness. the Court found no violation of the Pearce rule.
It was noted that the second jury was completely
uuaware of the original senteuce, and thus could hardly
have sought to "puuish" Chaffin for his successful appeal.
Moreover, the jury, unlike a judge who had beeu reversed
on appeal. could hardly have a stake in the prior conviction or any motivation to discourage criminal clefendauts
from seeking appellate review. Heuce, it was concluded
that the danger of vindictiveness under the circumstances
of the case was "de minimis," ·id., at 26, and did not
require adoption of tlw constitutional rule set out in

Pearce.
The lesson that emerges from Pearce, Colten, and
Cha!fi11 is that the Due Process Clause is not offended
by all possibilities of increased punishment upon ret~ial
after appeal, but only by those that pose a realistic likelihood of "vindicti venrss. " Unlike the circumstances presented by those cases, however, in the situation herr the
central figure is not the judge or the jury, but the prosecutor. The question is whether the opportunities for
vindictiveness in this situatiou are such as to impel the
conclusion that due process of law requires a rule analogous to that of the Pearce case. We conclude that the
answer must be in thr affirmative .
A prosecutor clearly has a considerable stake in discouraging convicted misdemeanants from appealing and
thus obtaining a trial de novo in the superior court, since
such an appeal will clearly require increased expenditures
of. prosecutorial resources before the defendant's conviction becomes final , and may even result in a formerly
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convicted defendant going free. And, if the prosecutor
has the means readily at hand to discourage such
appeals-by "upping the ante'' through a felony indictment whenever a convicted misdemeanant pursues his
statutory appellate remedy, the State can ins'ure that
only the most hardy defendants will brave the hazards
of a de 11ovo trial.
There is, of course, 110 evide nce that the prosecutor
in this case acted in bad faith or maliciously in seeking
:a felony indictmt>nt against Perry . Th0 rationale of our
,judgment in the Pearce case. however, was not p:roundcd
upon the proposition that actual retaliatory motivatwn
must inevitably exist. Rather. we emphasized that "sinc<>
thE' fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally
deter a defpndaJlt's exercise of the right to appeal his
first conviction, due process also requires that a defend ·
ant be freed of apprchPnsion of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the srntencing judge.'' 395 F. S ..
at 725. We think it clear that the same considrrations
apply here. A person convicted of an offense is entitled
to pursue his statutory right to a trial d(: novr>, without
apprehension that the State will rrtaliatr by ~ubstituting
a more serious charge' for the original one, thus subjecting him to a significantly increased potential period of
incarceration.'; Cf f'nited States v .Tnckson, 390 r S
570.
Due process of law requires that such a potential for
vindictiveness must not enter into North Carolina's two0 1\Ioreovcr, rvrn puttm~J: to on<· ~ld<' tiH' potputwl!ty of nH·rc·a~l·d
incarcemtiou, eonviction of a ''frlo n~-" oftc•n eutaib more ::;rrJou"
collateral COJ1.~rquenc·e::; than t ho;;e incurred through a rni~drmcanor
conviction. See genrrally Projc•rt , Thr CollatPml Cons<'quc·ncr~ of
a Criminal Conviction, :2;{ \'ami. L B<'v 929, 0.55-9()0; Note>, Civ1l
Disabilitie::; of Frlon;;, 5:3 \'~- L J1Pv . -tm, 40G--+O~ Cf. O'Brien 1
Skinner,- tr . 8. - (mvolving Nrw York Jaw, undrr which rcm victcd misd<•mranant" rrtnin th<· right to vote).
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tiered appellate process. We hold, therefore, that it was
not constitutionally permissible for the State to respond
to Perry's invocation of his statutory right to appeal by
bringing a more serious charge against him at the trial
de novo/

II
The remaining question is whether, because of his
guilty plea to the felony charge in the Superior Court,
Perry is precluded from raising his constitutional claims
in this federal habeas corpus proceeding. In contending
that such is the case, the p0titioner warden relies chiefly
on this Court's decision last Trrrn ill Tollett v. H enderson, 4.11 U. S. 258
The precise issue presented in Tollett was "whether a
state prisoner, pleading; guilty with the advice of counsel ,
may later obtain release through federal habeas corpus
by proving only that the inclictmen t to which he pleaded
was returned by an unconstitutionally selected grand
jury." ld., at 260. The Cour'"t answered that question
in the negative. Relying primarily on the guilty piea
trilogy of Brady v. United States , 397 U. S. 742;
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, and Parker v.
North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790, the Court characterized
the guilty plea as "a break in the chain of events which
has preceded it iu the criminal process." ld., at 267.
Accordingly, the Court held that when a criminal defendThis would clearly br a dif-l'rrent ca::;c 1f thr Statr had ~hown
that it was impo::;~ibln to JlrocE'ed ou thr morr ::;cnou::; charge at
the outset, as in Diaz v. Unitl'd .States, 22:3 U.S. 442. lu that ra~r
the defendant wa~ origin:tll)· tried and convicted for a::>::<Hult and
battrry. Sub::;equent to the original trial, the :.t~r;;ndt victim dird .
and the ddcndant wm; thPn trird aud convicted for homicidr.
Obviom;ly, it would not have been po::;siblr for the authoritirs in
Diaz to havr onginally proceed rei against t hr defendant on t hr more
srrious charge, ::>iJJCe the crime of bomicidP was not complete unt1l
after the victim'::; dettth .
1
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ant enters a guilty plea, "he may not thereafter raiEe
independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the
guilty plea." Ibid. Rather, a perwn complaining of
such "antecedent constitutional violations,;; id., at 266,
is limited in a federal habeas corpus proceeding to attacks
on the voluntary and intelligent nature of the guilty plea,
through proof that the advice received from counsel was
not "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." See Mc1vfann, supra, at 771.
Much of the language in Tollett is sweeping, and might
conceivably be read to support the arguments advanced
by the petitioner in this case. We think, however, that
there is a fundamental distinction between this case and
Tollett. While the underlying claims presented in Tollett and the Brady trilogy were of constitutional dimension, none went to the very power of the State to bring
the defendant into court to answer the charge brought
against him. The defendants in McMa11n v. Richardson, for example, could surely have been brought to trial
without the use of the allegedly coerced confessions, and
even a tainted indictment of the sort alleged in Tollett
could have been "cured" through a new indictment by
a properly selected grand jury. In the case at hallCI,
by contrast, the nature of the underlying constitutional
infirmity is markedly different. Having chosen originally to proceed on the misdemeanor charges in the District Court, the State of North Carolina was, under the
facts of this case, simply precluded by the Due Process
Clause from calling upon the respondent to answer to
the more serious charge in the Superior Court. Unlike
the defendant in Tollett , Perry is not complaiuing of
"antecedent constitutional violations" or of a "deprivation of constitutiontal rights that occurred prior to the
entry of the guilty plea." Rather, the right that he
asserts and that we today accept is the right not to be
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hailed into court at all upon the felony charge. The
very initiation of the proceedings against him in the
superior court thus operated to deny him due process of
law.
Last Term in Robin.son. v. Neil, 409 U. S. 505, in
explaining why the Double Jeopardy Clause is distinctive,
the Court noted that "its practical result is to prevent a
trial from taking place at all, rather than to prescribe the
procedural rules that govern the conduct of a trial." I d. ,
at 509. While our judgment today is not based upon the
Double Jeopardy Clause, we think that the quoted language aptly describes the due process right upon which
our judgment is based. The "practical result" dictated
by the Due Process Clause in this case is that North
Carolina simply could not permissibly require Perry to
answer to the felony charge. That being so, it follows
that his guilty plea did not foreclose him from attacking
his conviction in the Superior Court proceedings through
a federal writ of habeas corpus.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit is affirmed.
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MR. JusTICE S'l'EWART delivered the up1mou of the
Court.
While servll1g a term of impnsonment 111 a North
Carolina penitentiary , the respondent Perry became
mvolved in an altercation with another inmate. A
warrant issued, charging Perry with the misdemeanor
of assault with a deadly weapon, ~ . C. Gen. Stat.
§ 14-33 (b) (1) (1969 ed.). rndt>r North Carolina law,
tlw District Court Divisio11 of tlw ( ;eneral Court of
,Justice has exclusive JUrisdiction for tlH' trial of mis·
df'meanors. N C Gen . ~tat ~ 7 \ 272. Following a
trial without a .1 ury in thE' D1strict Court of .:-\orthamptoll County PPrry was convicted of this misdemeanor
and given a six-month sentence, to be !"erved after completion of the prison term he was then serving.
Perry then filed a notice of appeal to the Northampton
County Superior Court. ender ~orth Carolina law, a
person convicted in thP Distriet Court has a right to a
trial de novo in the Supenor C'omt. :'1:. C. Ucn. Htat.
§~ 7A-290, 15- 177.1
Thp right to trial de novo 1s
absolutE', there being no need for the a.ppPllant to allege
error in th<> original ])J'OCef'ding. Wlwn an appeal is taken,
the statutory schf'me provides that the slate is wiped clean )
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the prior conviCtwn IS annulled, and the prosecution and
the defense begin anew in the Superior Court. 1
After the ·filing of the notice of appeal, but prior to
the respondent's appearance for trial de novo in the
Superior Court, the prosecutor obtained an indictment
from a grand jury, charging Perry with the felony of
assault with a deadly weapon with in tent to kill inflict~
iug serious bodily injury, N. C. Gen. Stat. ~ 14- 32. The
indictment covered the same conduct for which Perry
had been tried and convicted in the District Court.
Perry entered a plea of guilty to the indictment in thf'
:Superior Court, and was sentenced to a term of five to
seven years in the penitentiary , to be served concurrently
with the prison sentence he was thc11 serving."
A number of l.JlOnths later, the respondent filed an
application for a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for th e Eastern District of North
Carolina. He claimed that the indictment on the felony
charge in the Superior Court constituted double jeopardy
and also deprived him of due process of law. In an unreported opinion , the District Court dismissed the petition
' See generally S tate v Sp encer, 276 N . C. 5:35, 173
0tute v. Spw-row, :276 N. C. 49!J, 17a 8 h. :.!d R97
2

~.

E. 2d 764 ;

The re:;vondent 's guilty plea wa:; a pparent ly prrmu.;ed ou 1he
expectation that. any ~ entPn ce hP rerri ved in th e superior court
would be served concurrently with th r :;<•ntenep h<· wa,; th Pn sPrvmg,
a;; c ontra~:;t rd with 1 he con~ ecutiw sentPn cr impo;;ed in the Di;;trict
C ourt That PXp E'ctation was fulftlled , but It turned out t hat th e
guilt y plea rp:;ulted in in c rpa~ing th E' rPs pondent 's pot Pntial tr rm of
mea rcPralion. Und r r appli cablr North Carolina law, t he fi ve- to
;;even-yea r assault :sent encr did not rommmcr until t he date of th E'
guilt y plPa, Oct ober :29. HHi!:J. By tha t tune, ]'('tTy had alrea dy
~ rr vrd 1:\0me 17 months of thr 8Pntrmr lw wa" ~rrv!Ilg at tlw tim e
of the a ll r!l:rd a ~~ault . Th u~. tlw pffrct of t hr fivp- to ~rven-year
roncurrt'nt ::,ent en ce on t lw a~:>sault charg<' wa.-. to Jllcrrao;t' In,; potP!ltial pr n od of coJJfint'ment. by tlw,;r 17 mont h:;, as oppo~rd to t. hc
.six-m onth increa ~r r nvisaged b~· t hr D1 ~t ri r t. Comt 's consecutive
:sent rnr.e
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for failure to exhaust available state remedies. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed, holding that resort to the state courts would
be futile, because the Supreme Court of North Carolina
had consistently rejected the constitutional claims presented by Perry in his petition. 453 F. 2d 856. 3 The
case was remanded to the District Court for further
proceedings.
On remand, the District Court granted the writ. It
held that the bringing of the felony charge after the filing
of the appeal violated Perry's rights under the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784. The District Court
furthrr held that the respondent had not, by his guilty
plea in the Superior Court, waived his right to raise his
constitutional claims in the federal habeas corpus proceeding. F. Supp. - . The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in a brief per curiam opinion. F . 2d - . We granted certiorari, 414 U. S. 980, to consider the seemingly important issues presented by this
case.
:l The Court of AppPab fur11wr mstructed the D1~trict Court to
nwa1i. the ruhng of this Court m Rice v. North Carolina, 434 F. 2d
297 (CA4), cert. granted, 401 U S. 100!-l. Rice mvolwd a challenge to the constitutionality of au enhanced penalty received after
a criminal defendant had :;ought a trial de 1wvo under North Carolina's two-tiered misdemeanor adjudication system. This Court did
not rrach the merits of this IS!!ur in Rice, instead vacating and
remanding to the Court
AppC'nl;< for consideration a~ to whether
thr case had become moot 404 P S. 244.
Subsequently, in Co/ten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104, we dealt with
the mC'nts of this issue , and held that the ImpositiOn of an increased
selltt'l1('C on trial de novo did not violatE' rither the Due Process or
the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Du;tnct Court in the present
ra~e had the benefit of the Colten drci:oion before issuing its opinion
grantmg hn.hr.as corpus rehef.

or
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I
As in the District Court, Perry directs two independent constitutional attacks upon the conduct of the
State in hailing him into court on the felony charge after
he took an appeal from the misdemeanor conviction.
First, he contends that the felony indictment in the
superior court placed him in double jeopardy, since he
had already been convicted on the lesser included misdemeanor charge in the District Court. Second, he urges
that the indictment on the felony charge constituted
a penalty for his exercising his statutory right to appeal,
and thus contravened the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' We find it necessary to reach
only the latter claim .
Perry's due process arguments are derived substantially from North. Carolina v. Pearce, 395 ·e. ~. 711, and
1ts progeny. In Pearce, the Court considered the constitutional problems presented when, following a successful
appeal and reconviction, a criminal defendant was subjected to a greater punishment than that imposed at the
first trial. While we concluded that such a harsher sentence was not absolutely precluded by either the Double
Jeopardy or Due Process Clause, we emphasized that
"imposition of a penalty upon the defendant for having
successfully pursued a statutory right of appeal or collateral remedy would be . . a violation of due process
·~ Th1s Court has never held that the StateH are constitutionally
required to establish avenues of appellate review of criminal convictions. Nonetheless , "it is now fundamental that, once established,
these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that
can only impede open Hnd equal acce.ss to the court::; ." Rinaldi v.
Yeager, 884 U. S. 305, 310. See alr:;o Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S,
12 ; Douglas v. California , 372 U. S. 335 ; Lane v. Brown, 372 U. S.

477 ; Draper v. Wa.shington, ;~72 F . S. 487 : Nor·th CaroLina v,
Pearce , 395 U. S. 711, 724-725 : Chaffin v Stunchcombe, 412 U. S.

17, 24

!L

11.
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o£ law." I d., at 724. Because "vindictiveness against
a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives
after a new trial," id., at 725, we held that an increased
sentence could not be imposed upon retrial unless the
sentencing judge placed certain specified findings on the
record.
In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104; the Court was
called upon to decide the applicability of the Pearce
holding to Kentucky's two-tiered system of criminal
adjudication. Kentucky, like North Carolina, allows
a misdemeanor defendant convicted in an inferior trial
court to seek a retrial de novo in a court of general
jurisdiction. 5 The appellant in Colten claimed that the
Constitution prevented thE' court of general jurisdiction,
after trial de novo, from imposing a srntence in excess of
that imposed in the court of original trial. This C'ourt
rejected the Pearce analogy Emphasizing that Pem·ce
was directed at insurillg the absence of "vindictiveness"
against a criminal defendant who attacked his initial
conviction on appeal, thE' Court found such dangers
greatly minimized on the facts presented in Colten. In
contrast to Pearce, the court that imposed the increased
sentence after retrial in Colten was 11ot the one whose
original judgment had promptE'd all appellate reversal;
thus, there was little possibility thai an increased sentence on trial de novo could havE' been motivated by per~
soual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing judge.
Hence, the Court thought the prophylactic rule of
Pearce unnecessary in the de novo trial and sentencing
context of Colten
The Pearce decision was agam mterpreted by this
Court last Term in Chaffin,, 8tynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17,
For u, more exbaustlvo hst of Staib' t·mplonug
procPdum<:;, Hl'e Colten, su.pm, ·tt 11 2 n. 4,
5

~urular

two-tiered
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ii1 the setting of Georgia's system under which sentencing
responsibility is entrusted to the Jury. Upon retrial
following the reversal of his original conviction, the
defendant in Chaffin was reconvicted and sentenced to
a greater term than had been imposed by the initial
jury. Concentrating again on the issue of vindictive~
ness, the Court found no violatwn of the Pearce rule.
It was noted that the seco11d Jury was completely
unaware of the original sentence, and thus could hardly
have sought to "1mnish" Chaffin for his successful appeal.
Mon•over, the jury, unlikr a .Judg<' "·ho had been reversed
on appeal, could hardly have a stake in the prior convic~
tion or any motivation to discourage criminal defendants
from seeking appellate review Hence. rt was concluded
that the danger of vmdictivencss under th<' circurnstanceg
of the case was ''de mini111is," 1d., at 2fi. a11d did not.
reqmre adoption of the coJJStitutwual rulP 8et out m

Pearce.
The lesson that emrrges from Pearce, Colten, and
Chaffin is that the Dur Process ClauRe IS not offended
by all possibilities of increased pumshmeut upon retrial
after appeal, but only by those that pose a realistic likelihood of "vindictiveness.'' lT nlike the circumstances presented by those cases, however. in the situation here thr
central figure is uot the judge or thr Jury, but the prosecutor The question is whether the opportunities for
vindictiveness in this situation are guch as to impel the
conclusion that due process of law requires a rule analogous to that of the Pearce case. We conclude that the
answer must be in the affirmative
A prosecutor clearly has a considerable stake m discouraging convicted misderneanants from appealing and
thus obtaining a trial de novo in the' superior court, since
such an appeal will clearly n'quire increased ex penditures
of prosecutorial resources hdorr the dE·fe11dant's conviction becomes final, and may 8VPJJ result .in a formerly
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convicted defendant going free. And, if the prosecutor
has the means readily at hand to discourage such
appeal&-by "upping the ante" through a felony indictment whenever a convicted misdemeanant pursues his
statutory appellate remedy, the State can insure that
only the most hardy defendants will brave the hazards
of a de novo trial.
There is, of course, no evidence that the prosecutor
in this case acted in bad faith or maliciously in seeking
a felony indictment against P0rry. The rationale of our
judgment i11 the Pearce cat:e, howeV0r, was not grounded
Upon the proposition that actual retaliatory motivatioll
must inevitably exist. Rather, we emphasi11ed that "since
the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutiona11y
deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal his
first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the Sf'ntencing .i udge." 395 r. 14.,
at 725. We think it clear that the same considerations
apply here. A person convicted of an offcnsC' is cntitl0d
to pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo, without
apprehension that the State will retaliate by substituting
a more serious charge for the original one, thus subjecting him to a significantly increased potential period of
incarceration.'; C'f. [7 nited SLates v. Jackson, 300 U. S.
570.
Due process of law requires that such a potential for
vindictiveness must not enter into i'\orth Carolina's two6 MorcovC'r, evrn puttmg to onP ~iciP tlw putrnlmlJty of increa:-;ed
incarceration, conviction of a ''fdony" oftrn rntaih; more srrious
collateral consequences thc111 those incurred through a misdemeanor
conviction . See generally Pro jeri, The Colla lrral Consequencr~ of
a Criminal CmlYictio11, 23 Vand. L. Rev . 929, 055-960 ; Note, Civtl
Disabilitie;; of Felon~, 5a Va. L. HC'v ...!Q:~. 40()-40R. Cf. O'Brien \ ,
Skinner,- U. S. - (mvolving New York law, under which convicted misdemeananl8 Trtain thr right tu \' 01.PI .
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tiered appellate process. We hold, therefore, that it was
not constitutionally permissible for the State to respond
to Perry's invocation of his statutory right to appeal by
bringing a more serious charge against him at the trial
de novo/

.II
The remaining question is whether, because of hi~
guilty plea to the felony charge in the Superior Court!
Perry is precluded from raising his constitutional claims
in this federal habeas corpus proceeding. In contendihg
that such is the case, the petitioner warden relies chiefly
on this Court's decision last Term in Tollett v. Hender·
son, 411 U. S. 258.
The precise issue presented in Tollett was "whether a
state prisoner, pleading guilty with the advice of counsel,
may later obtain release through federal habeas corpus
by proving only that the indictment to which he pleaded
was returned by an unconstitutionally selected grand
jury.'' /d., at 260. The Court answered that question
in the negative. Relying primarily on the guilty plea
trilogy of Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742;
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, and Parker v.
North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790, the Court characterized
the guilty plea as "a break in the chain of events which
has preceded it in the criminal process.'' !d., at 267.
This would clearly be a differPnt case if thP State had shown
that it was impossible to proceed on the more serious charge at
the outset, as .m Diaz v. United States, 223 U. S. 442 . In that case
the defendant was originally trif'd and convicted for assault and
battery. Subsequent to the original trial, thf' a;;sault victim died.
and the defendant was thrn tried and convicted for homicide.
Obviously, it would not have bf'en poRHiblf' for the authorities in
Diaz to have originally procreded against the defendant on the more
serious charge, since the crime of homicide was not complete until
after the victim's death.
7

72-1660-0PlNlON

BLACKLEDGE v. PERRY

9

Accordingly, the Court held that when a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, "he may not thereafter raise
independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the
guilty plea." Ibid. Rather, a person complaining of
such "antecedent constitutional violations," id., at 266,
is limited in a federal habeas corpus proceeding to attacks
on the voluntary and intelligent nature of the guilty pleal
through proof that the advice received from counsel was
not "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." See Mc 1liann, supra, at 771 .
While the petitioner's reliauce upon the Tollett opinion
is understandable, there is a fundamental distinction between this case and that one, Although the underlying
claims presented in Tollett and the Brady trilogy were of
constitutional dimension, none went to the very power of
the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the
charge brought against him. The defendants in M eM ann
v. Richardson, for example, could surely have been brought
to trial without the use of the allegedly coerced confessions,
and even a tainted indictment of the sort alleged in TolleU
could have been "cured" through a new indictment by
a properly selected grand jury. In the case at hand,
by contrast, the nature of the underlying constitutional
infirmity is markedly different. Having chosen originally to proceed on the misdemeanor charges in the District Court, the State of North Carolina was, under the
facts of this case, simply precluded by the Due Process
Clause from calling upon the respondent to answer to
the more serious charge in the Superior Court. Unlike
the defendant in Tollett, Perry is not complaining of
"antecedent constitutional violations" or of a "deprivation of constitutiontal rights that occurred prior to the
entry of the guilty plea." Rather, the right that he
asserts and that we today accept is the right not to be

I
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hailed into court at all upon the felony charge. The
very initiation of the proceedings against him in the
superior court thus operated to deny him due process of
law.
Last Term in Robinson v. Neil, 409 U. S. 505, in
explaining why the Double Jeopardy Clause is distinctive,
the Court noted that "its practical result is to prevent a
trial from taking place at all, rather than to prescribe the
procedural rules that govern the conduct of a trial." I d.,
at 509. While our judgment today is not based upon the
Double Jeopardy Clause, we think that the quoted language aptly describes the due process right upon which
our judgment is based. The "practical result' ' dictated
by the Due Process Clause in this case is that North
Carolina simply could not permissibly require Perry to
answer to the felony charge. That being so, it follows
that his guilty plea did not foreclose him from attacking
his conviction in the Superior Court proceedings through
a federal writ of habeas corpus.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit is affirmed.
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MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
I would find it more difficult than the Court apparently does in Part I in its opiniot1. to conclude that the
very brin gi ng of more serious charges against respondf'nt
following his request for a trial de novo violated due
process as defined i11 N o1·th Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. H.
711 ( 1969). Still more importantly, I believe the Court's
conclusion that respondent may assert the Court's newfound Pearce claim i11 this fedPral habeas action. despit<'
his plea of guilty to the charges brought after his iuvoea,tion of his statutory right to a trial de novo, tnarks an
unwarranted departure from the prine1plc•s WP have
recently enunciated in Tollett v Henderson, 411 l. S. 158
(1973), and the Brady trilogy, Brady \. Uuited States,
397 U.S. 742 ( 1970). AfcMann v Richardson, 3P7 U. H.
759 ( 1970), and Parker v. .Vorth Carolina, 397 U. S. 7HO
( 1970).

I
As the Court notes, in additioJJ tio his claim bar-;ed Oil
Pearce respondent contends that his fC'louy indictnwnt
in the superior court violatPd his rights uud<~r tlw
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. madE'
applicable to th e States through the Fourteenth Amendmen t , Benton v. Maryland, 395 F. S. 784 (1969). Pre ..
sumably because we have earlier held that "the jeopardy

_.bl') _ _
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incident to" a trial does "no ~xtend to an offense beyond
l the trial court'sj jurisdiction,'' Diaz v. [/ nited States,
223 U. S. 442, 449 (1912), the Court rests its decision
instead on the Fourteenth Amendment due process doctrine of Pearce. In so doing, I think the Court too
rPadily equates the role of the prosecutor. who is a natural
adversary of the defendant and who we observed in
Chaffin v. Stynchcmnbe, 412 U. ~. 17,27 (1973), "often
requestfs21 more than [.he~ can reasonably expect to get,''
with that of the sentencing judge in Pearce . l also think
the Court passes too lightly over the reasoning of Colten
v. Keutucky, 407 U. S. 104 ( 1972), in which we held
that imposition of the prophylatic rule of Pearce was not
necessary in K<>ntucky's two-tier system for dP novo appeals from justice court convictions, evru though the
judge at retrial might impose a more sever<' sclltPnC<'
than had been imposed by the justice court after the original trial.
The dissenting opinion in Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 726,
took the position that the imposition of a penalty after
retrial which exceeded the penalty imposed after the
first trial violated the guarantee against double jeopardy.
But the opinion of the Court. relying on cases such as
United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662 (1896), and Stroud
v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (HH9). HpecificaJly r('jected
such an approach to the case. The Court went on to
hold "tha.t neither the double jeopardy provision nor
the equal protection clause imposes an absolute bar to a
more severe sentence upon reconviction." 395 U. S., at
723. The Court concluded by holding that due process
"requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for
having successfully attacked his first conviction must play
no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial;
And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter· a defendant's exel'cise of the right to
appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due
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process also requires that a defendant be freed of appre-·
hension of such a retaliatory motivation on the par~ of
the sentencing judge." 395 U. S., at 725. To make
certain that those requirements of due proces were met,
the Court laid down the rule that "whenever a judge
imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after
a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear." 895 U. S .. at 726. Thus the avowed
purpose of the remedy fashioned in Pearce was to prevent judicial vindictiveness from resulting in longer
sentencPs after a rPtrial following successful appeal.
Since in theory if not in practice the second sentence
in the Pearce situation might be expected to be the same
as the first unless influenced by vindictiveness or by
intervening conduct of the defendant, in theory at least
the remedy mandated there reached no further than the
identified wrong. The same cannot be said here. For
while indictment on more serious charges after a successful appeal would preseut a problem closely analogous to
that in Pearce in this respect. the bringing of more
serious charges after a defendant's exercise of his absolute right to a trial de novo in North Carolina's two-tier
system does not. The prosecutor here elected to proceed
initially in the state district court where felony charges
could not be prosecuted, for reasons which may well have
been unrelated to whether he believed respondent was
guilty of a.nd could be coD victcd of the felony with which
he was later charged. Both prosecutor and defendant
stand to benefit from an initial prosecutiou in the District
Court, the prosecutor at least from its less burdensome
procedures and the defendant from the opportuuity for
an initial acquittal and the limited peualties. With the
countervailing reasons for proceeding only on the misdemeanor charge in th(' District Court no longer applicable oncf' the rlefend~wt has invoked his statutory right
to a. trial de novo, a prose<1utor nef'd tWt"· lw vindietive

,,
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to seek to indict and convict a defendant of the more
serious of the two crimes of which he believes the defendant guilty. Thus even if one accepts the Court's
equation of prosecutorial vindictiveness with judicial
vindictiveness, here, uulike Pearce, the Court's remedy
reaches far beyond the wrong it identifies.
Indeed, it is not a little puzzling that the Court's
remedy is the same that would follow upon a conclusion
that the bringing of the new charges violated respondent's rights under the Doublf• Jeopardy Clause. And the
Court's co11clusion that "the very initiation of the proceedings against [respondent] in thr ~uperior Court
operated to rleny h~ue process of law " surely sounds
in the language of double jeopardy, however, it may be
dressed in clue process garb.

H
If the Court is correct in stabng the consequences
of upholding respondent's constitutional claim here,
and indeed the State lacked "the very power to bring
him to trial," I believe this case is governed by cases
culminating in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S. 258
( 1973). In that case the state no doubt lacked "power"
to bring Henderson to trial without a valid grand jury
indictment; yet that constitutional disability was held
by us to be merged in the guilty plea. I do uot see why
a constitutional claim the consequences of which make
it the identical twin of double jeopardy rnay not, like
double jeopardy, be waived by the per·son for whose
benefit it is accorded. Kepner v. United States, 195
U.S. 100, 131 (1904); Harris v. United States, 237 F. 2d
274, 277 (CAS 1956); Kistner v. Un£ted States, 332 F.
2d 978, 980 (CA8 1964),
In Tollett v. Henderson, supra, we hold that "just
as the guilty pleas in the Brady trilogy were found to
foreclose direct inquiry into the merits of claimed ante-
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cedent constitutional violations there, ./.. respondent's
guilty plea here alike forecloses independent inquiry into
the claim of discrimination in the selection of the grand
jury." 411 U. S., at 266. Surely the due process violation found by the Court today is no less "antecedent"
than the constitutional violations claimed to make the
grand jury indictment invalid in Tollett v. Henderson,
the confession inadmissible in M eM ann, or the exercise
of the right to a jury trial impermissibly burdened in
Brady and Parker. As the Court notes, we reaffirmed in
Tollett v. Henderson the principle of the Brady trilogy
that "a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of
events which has preceded it in the criminal process."
411 U. S., at 267. We went on to say there:
"When a criminal dcfenda n t has solemnly admitted
in open court that he is iu fact guilty of the offense
with which he is charged. he may not thereafter
raise independent claims relating to the deprivation
of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the
entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the
voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea
by showing that the advice he received from counsel
was not within the standards set forth in McMa'nn .''
Ibid.
The assertion by the Court that this reasoning is somehow inapplicable here because the claim goes "to the
very power of the State to bring the defendant into court
to answer the charge brought against him" is little other
than a conclusion. Any difference between tho issue
resolved the other way in 'Pollett v. Henderson nnd the
issue before us today is at most sematic. But the Court's
"test" not only fails to distingui sh Hen,derson ; it nlso
fails to provide any reasoned basis on which to approach
such questions as whether a speedy trial claim is merged
in a guilty plea. l believe the Court's departure today
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from the principles of Henderson and the cases preceding
it must be recognized as a potentially major breach in
the wall of certainty surrounding guilty pleas for which
we have found constitutional sanction in those cases.
There is no indication in this record that respondent's
guilty plea was the result of an agreement with the prosecutor. But the Court's basis for distinguishing the
Henderson and Brady cases seeins so insubstantial as to
permit the doctrine of this case to apply to guilty pleas
which ha~~een obtained as a result of "plea bargains."
In that event it will be not merely the State which stands
to lose, but the accused defendant in thP position of the
respondent as well. For the State has little incentive to
agree to reduce a charge against an accuf:ed dcfeudaut m
exchange for a guilty plea, if the defeudant may repudiate
his part of the bargain at will upon his assertion that
there was a constitutional infirmity at an earlier stage
of the proceedings.

III
But if, as I believe, a proper analysis of respondent's
constitutional claim produces at most a violation of the
standards laid down in North Carolina v. Pearce, supra,
I agree with the Court, though not for the reasons it gives,
that respondent's claim was not merged in his guilty
plea. Imposition of sentence in violation of Pearce is
not an "antecedent constitutional violation," since sentence is customarily imposed after a plea of guilty, and
is a separate legal event from the determination by the
Court that the defendant is in fact guilty of the offense
with which he is charged.
If respondent's claim is properly analyzed in terms of
Pearce, I would think that a result quite different from
that mandated in the Court's opinion would obtain.
Pearce and the decisions following it have made it clear
that the wrong lies in the increased sentence, not in the
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judgment of conviction, and that the remedy for a Pearce
,defect is a remand for sentencing consistent with due
process. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 247-248
(1971). In Rice we concluded that the Court of Appeal!
had erred in ruling that Pearce authorized the expunging
of Rice's conviction after his de novo retrial in North
.Carolina:
"It could not be clearer . . . that Pearce does not
invalidate the conviction that resulted from Rice's
second trial . . . . Pearce, in short, requires only
resentencing; the conviction is not ipso facto set
aside and a new tri.al required. Even if the higher
sentence imposed after Rice's trial de novo was
vulnerable under Pearce, Rice was entitled neither
to have his sentence .era&ed nor tQ avoid the collateral
,consequences flowing fr~m · 'th~t conviction and a
proper sentence." Ibid.
~ Since

Rice had completely served his sentence, rather
than reaching the merits of Rice's Pearce claim, we remanded for a determination whether any collateral consequences flowed from his service of the longer sentence
imposed after retrial, or whether the case was moot.
Here, while respondent faced the prospect of a more
severe sentence at the conclusion of his felony .trial in
the Superior Court of North Carolina, it was by no means
. self-evident that this would be the result. ~The maximum
sentence which he could receive on the misdemeanor
, count was one and one-half years; but nothi11g in the recor.d
indicates that the Superior Court judge might not impose a lesser penalty than that, or even grant probation.
Nor is there any indication in, the habeas record, which
contains only a fragment of the state court proceedings,
that the Superior Court · judge might not at the con ..
elusion of the trial and after a verdict of guilty have
· before him for sentencing purposes ,information which
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would support an augmented sentence under Pearce. In
fact, the habeas court found that the sentence actually
imposed was more severe than that which could have
been imposed under the misdemeanor charge. But the
remedy for that violation should be a direction to the
state court to resentence in accordance with Pearce, rather
than an order completely anulling the conviction. Re~
spondent was originally convicted of assaulting a fellow
inmate with a deadly weapon, and later pleaded guilty
to a charge of assaulting the inmate with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill him. But in spite of both a
verdict of guilty on one charge and a plea of guilty to
the other, the Court's decision may well, as a practical
matter, assure that no penalty whatever will be imposed
on him.

\
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I think this is all balled up . May
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to this case is so clear ( and so clearly
not dealt with adequately· here) that I
wonder if I'm missing something . Jack
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Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
~Justice Powell
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Mn. JusTICE REHNQUIS'l', dissenting.
I would find it more difficult than the Court appar ~
ently does in Part I in its opinion to conclude that the
sentence imposed by the North Carolina courts violated
Fourteenth Amendment due process as defined in North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969 ). I think the
Court too readily equates the role of the prosecutor, who
is a natural adversary of the defendant and who we
observed in Chaffin v. Stynchcornbe, 412 U. S. 17, 27,
"often request[sJ rnore than [he] can reasouably expect
to get," with that of the sentencing judgt- in Pearce. I
also think the Court passes over too lightly the reasoning
of Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104 (1972). in which
we held that Kentucky's two tier appellate system for
de novo appeals from justice court convjctions did uot
offend Pearce, even though the judge at retrial might
impose a more severe sentence than had been imposed by
the Justice Court
the original trial.
My principal difference with the Court arises over its
conclusion, in Part II of the opinion, that "the very
initiation of the proceedings against [respondent] in the
Superior Court operated to deny him due process of law ''
The Court states initially that it is not rea.ching respond~
ent's double jeopardy contention, but the quoted state-3
ment surely sounds in the language of doubl.e jeopardy!
howeve\ it may be dressed in due process garb,

.
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The dissenting opinion in Pearce, 39,5 U. S. 711, 726,
took the position that the imposition of a penalty after
retrial which exceeded the peualty imposed after the
first trial violated the guarantee against doub]t;) jeopardy.
But the opinion of the Court. relying on cases such as
United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662 ( 1896), a.nd Stroud
v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), specifically rejected
such an approach to the case. The Court went on to
hold "that neither the double jeopardy provision nor
the equal protection clause imposes an absolute bar to a,
more severe sentence upon reconviction." 395 U. S., at
723 . The Court concluded by holding that due process
11
requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for
having successfully attacked his first conviction must play
no part in the sentence he receives after a new triaL
And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally dPter a defendant's exercise of the right to
appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due
process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of
thr sentencing judge." 39.5 U. S., at 72fi. To make
certain that those requiremrnts of due proces were nwt.
thP Court laid down the rule that "whenever a judg·e
imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after
a new trial , the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear" 395 U. S .. at 72o. Thus thr whole
thrust of Pearce, as written, was not to bar a subsequent
prosecution of the defendant for the conduct which had
resulted in his conviction in the first instance, but rather
to assure that although the second proceeding might take
place, no more severe sentence should lw imposrd as a
result of judicial vindictiveness.
It is therefore puzzling indeed to find the Court 11ow
speaking in terms that implicate "the very power of tbe
stat<" to bring the defendant into court to answer the
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charge brought against him." Slip opinion, p. 9. If
the Court were correct in stating: the coi1sequences of
upholding respondent's constitutional claim here, and
indeed the state lacked "the very power to bring him to
trial," I would think this case was governed by cases
culminating in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S. 258
( 1973). In that case the state no doubt lacked "power"
to bring Henderson to trial without a valid grand jury
indictment; yet that constitutional disability was held
by us to be merged in the guilty plea. I do not see why
a constitutional claim Wthe consequences of which make
it the identical twin to double jeopardy may not, like
double jeopardy, be waived by the person for whose
benefit it is accorded. Kepner v. United States, 195
U.S. 100, 131 (1904); Harris v. United States, 237 F. 2d
274, 277 (CAS 1956); K1:stner v. United States, 332 F .
2d 97S, 9SO (CAS 1964) .
But if, as I believe, a proper analysis of respondent's
constitutional claim produces at most a violation of the
standards laid down in North Carolina v. Pearce, supra,
agree with the Court, thou h not for the reasons it ives,
fV O
at res ondent's claim was not mer ed in his uilt
plea. Impositwn o sen~er~.~-~~i?lati~1 of Pearce is
/[lot an "antecedent constitutional violation. " since sen~ence is customarily imposed after a plea of guilty, and
(
_is a separate legal event from the determination by the
__
,,~,-t~
Court that the defendant is in fact guilty of the offense
1
/Lf!' !Ct?-IC.. . •CL.v
with which he is charged.
, Jep t.,~-.Ur
.
If respondent's claim is properly analyzed in terms of
e) ~fu..,.- Pearce, I would think that a result quite different from
u.,.. ~
that mandated in the Court's opinion would obtain.
~~- t_l:t ~ .A. rf2.t> fA.')(.--2(.·< Pearce and the decisions followin!f it have made it cle~r
ffiatth:e wrong lies in the increased sentence, not in the
jlt?~
t V~
judgment of conviction, and that the remedy_.for.a.E.e.a.a;e
Uefect is a remand for sentencing consistent with due
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process. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 247-248
( 1971). In Rice we concluded that the Court of Appeals
had erred in ruling that Pearce authorized the expunging
of Rice's conviction after his de novo retrial in North
Carolina :
"It could not be clearer ... that Pearce does not
invalidate the conviction that resulted from Rice's
second trial . . . . Pearce, in short, requires only
resentencing; the conviction is not ipso facto set
aside and a new trial required . Even if the higher
sentence imposed after Rice 's trial de novo was
vulnerable under Pearce, Rice was entitled neither
to have his sentence erased nor to avoid the collateral
consequences flowing from that conviction and a
proper sentence." Ibid.
Since Rice had completely served Ius sentence, rather
than reaching the merits of Rice 's Pearce claim) We remanded for a determination whether any collateral consequences flowed froffi),~ service of the longer sentence
imposed after retrial, or whether the case was moot.
Here, while respondent faced the prospect of a more
severe sentence at the conclusiou of his felony trial in
the Superior Court of North Carolina, it was by no means
st>lf-evident that this would be the result. The maximum
sentence which he could receive on the misdemeanor
count was one and one-half years, but nothing in the record
indicates that the Superior Court judge might not impose a lesser penalty than that, or even grant probation.
Nor is there any indication in the habeas record, which
contains only a fragment of the state court proceedings,
that the Superior Court judge might not at the conclusion of the trial and after a verdict of guilty have
before him for sentencing purposes information which
would support an augmented sentence under Pearce. In
fact, the habeas court found that the sentence actually
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imposed was more severe than that which could have
been imposed under the misdemeanor charge. But the
remedy for that violation should be a direction to the
state court to resentence in accordance with Pearce, rather
than an order completely anulling the conviction. Respondent was originally convicted of assaulting a fellow
inmate with a deadly weapon, and later pleaded guilty
to a charge of assaulting the inmate with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill him. But in spite of both a
verdict of guilty on one charge and a plea of guilty to
the other, the Court's decision seems to assure that no
,penalty whatever will be ill\,posed ou him.

lfp/SS
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
I join Part II of Justice Rehnquist's dissent, but
this brief statement to emphasize

my

view that the

decision in Tollet• v. Henderson, 411 U.S.
158 (1973) is controlling as to the effect of respondent's
guilty plea.
In Henderson, we held that a guilty plea, otherwise
valid, foreclosed a subsequent attack on the constitutional
validity of the grand jury that had indicted the defendant.
The Court today holds that this defendant [respondent]
despite and otherwise valid guilty plea, may attack
subsequently the prosecutorial decision to ehhance the
charge on appeal
In

my

2! ~

from a misdemeamor to a felony .

view, these two holdings are analytically irreconcilable .

If the possible vindictiveness of the prosecutor, burdening
the right of appeal, goes to the "very power of the state
to bring a defendant into court", one would have thought
that the pasible constitutional infirmity of the grand jury,
resulting in an invalid indictment, also would go to the
"very power of the state" to try a defendant.

2.

If we are to overrule Henderson within a few months
after deciding it, I would hope that the Court would do so
expressly and with appropriate articulation of its rationale.
I would adhere to Henderson for, as Mr. Justice Rehnquist
points out, it is important in the interest of the
administration of justice for guilty pleas, made voluntarily
and knowingly with advice of counsel, to be respected as
a definitive resolution of all issues that could have been
raised prior to the guilty plea.

An accused defendant

has at least as great an interest in the finality of

sa

a guilty plea as does the state, as the entire structure
of plea bs.rgaining is based upon the assumption of finality.

May 10, 1974

No. 72-1660 Blackledge v. Perry
Dear Bill:
Please join me in Part II of your dissenting opinion.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Relmquist

lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

May 10, 1974

No. 72-1660 Blackledge v. Perry
Dear Bill:
I am happy to join Part II of your dissent in the above
ease. As Tollett seems controlling, it is unnecessary for
me to address other issues.
I considered filing a separate dissenting opinion along
the lines of the enclosed draft, but have decided not to do
so. Do not hesitate to use any part of this draft, if it
should appeal to you.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

lfp/ss

lfp/ss
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No. 72-1660 BLACKLEDGE v. PERRY
MR. JUSTICE POWELL , dissenting.
I join Part II of Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissent, but
add this brief statement to emphasize my view that the
Court ' s recent decision in Tollett v . Henderson, 411

u.s .

285 (1973) is controlling as to the effect of respondent ' s
guilty plea.
The Court today allows a post-conviction challenge
to a felony indictment , even though respondent had entered
an otherwise valid guilty plea to the indictment.

The

basic for this belated challenge is that the indictment
was handed up after respondent exercised his right under
state law to a
conviction .

~ ~

trial following a misdemeanor

In Tollett, we held that a voluntary guilty plea

foreclosed a subsequent attack on the constitutional validity
of the grand jury that had indicted the defendant .
In my view, the holdings in Tollett and in the instant
case are irreconcilable .
right to seek trial de

If the possible burden on the

~

inherent in the challenged

felony indictment in this case goes to the "very power
i
!

i I

2.
of the state to bring a defendant into court", supra at

_,

one would have thought that the possible constitutional
infirmity of the grand jury in Tollett, resulting in an
invs.lid indictment, also went to the "very

p~mer

of the

state" to try a defendant.
If we are to eviscerate Tollett so soon after deciding
it, I would hope that the Court would do so expressly and
with appropriate articulation of its ra.tionale.

I would

adhere to Tollett, for, as MR. JUSTICE REHNOUIST points out,
the efficacious administration of justice demands that guilty
pleas, made voluntarily and with the advice of counsel, be
respected as a definitive resolution of antecedent issues.
Since the great majority of ctiminal cases are resolved
by plea bargaining, defendants as a class have at least
as great an interest in the finality of voluntary guilty
pleas as do prosecutors.

If that finality may be swept

aside with the ease exhibited by the Court's approach today,
prosecutors will have a reduced incentive to bargain, to
the detriment of the many defendants for whom plea bargaining
offers the only hope for ameliorating the consequences to
them of a serious criminal charge.
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THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE

May 14, 1974

Re:

72-1660 - Blackledge v. Perry

Dear Potter:
Please join me.

I
1

Regal:"ds,

Vr~ (~
Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference
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